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School Choice: Structured through Markets and Morality
Thomas J. Lasley II
Carolyn R. Ridenour
University of Dayton

Abstract
School choice is increasingly promulgated as a promising education reform policy for failing urban
schools, but no solid evidence has yet shown the promise fulfilled. The authors argue that choice based
on market theory without a moral center is insufficient. Without a moral foundation, such market-driven
choice programs may actually disadvantage some children further. A market approach, absent a moral
perspective, fails to encompass all the necessary dimensions for an educational system that can fulfill
the traditional commitment to the common good and effectively serve all urban children, their families,
and society. Six moral principles are offered along with examples of reform initiatives that may begin to
evidence a morally-centered market viewpoint.
School choice is the current educational reform mantra, especially for conservative critics of public education.
Competition putatively will improve educational quality,
drive down educational costs, and ultimately create a more
dynamic educational system. Whether or not the choice
theory holds is questionable. Although experiments in market competition are increasing, no clear evidence exists to
show that market-driven systems result in enhanced student
achievement. The critical question is: Does choice result in
more educationally advantageous approaches for America’s
most vulnerable students—the students who are poor, of
color, and reside in urban environments? This question looms
large over educational policymakers because school choice
schemes are an increasingly popular strategy for urban school
reform; choice schemes are almost nonexistent in suburban
and rural areas. School choice is in essence an issue of urban schools.
Many of the historic public school structures created
for K-12 students have failed to deliver on implicit promises (Tyack and Cuban, 1995), necessitating strong calls for
school reform. That failure is most pronounced in America’s
urban secondary schools. The comprehensive secondary
school has served America’s rich and poor for decades.
Unfortunately, a one-size-fits-all school has not accommodated a significant segment of America’s minority and low
income population who are disproportionately enrolled in
inner city (and typically high poverty and highly diverse)
schools. For example, within the 61 largest urban school
systems in this country, almost 77% of the students in 20012002 were African American, Hispanic, or other students of
color; this proportion compares to about 38% in all schools
across the country (Council of Great City Schools, 2004).
Of students in these largest urban systems, 63% were eligible for free lunch subsidy in 2001-2002, compared to about
40% of students across the country (Council of Great City
Schools, 2004). And, African-American, Latino, and Native
American students dropped out of schools in absurdly large
numbers (in excess of 50 percent in many urban environments). Even for white students in affluent areas the gradu-
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ation rates are often distressingly low. And, while it is true
that many students drop out and then secure a GED, it is
equally true that serious questions arise as to whether a GED
equates to a traditional diploma.
Enter Friedman and a myriad of neoconservative choice
advocates. For Friedman and other market theorists, parent
choice is the golden coin of the educational realm. Ostensibly, they do not oppose public schools; rather, they argue
for a wide variety of for-profit, charter, parochial and government schools. Some choice advocates agree that the competition may initially create unevenness in quality, but over
time those in poor urban environments will benefit from what
those with affluence have demanded—better schools. Friedman captures the idea through an analog:
Throughout history, hasn’t the relationship been just
the other way around [with affluent families selecting the best schools for their children and poor families relegated to poor schools]? When automobiles
first came out, they were very expensive. Only the
rich could afford them. What happens over time,
the well-to-do provide, as it were, the experimental funds to develop an industry. Automobiles are
developed. The well-to-do buy them, and that provides the basis for a small industry. The industry
grows, it develops better techniques, it becomes
cheaper, and now almost everybody has an automobile. Surely, there’s much less difference in the
stratification of people buying automobiles now
than there was, let’s say, a hundred years ago, when
the automobile industry was just getting started.
Again, televisions were developed in the 1930s.
They were very expensive; only the rich bought
them. But now everybody has a television. And in
general, over history, every improvement has benefited mostly low-income people. (cited in Kane,
2003, p. 58)
The public school was established not as a consumer
good or a technological advancement such as the automobile, but historically has served a public purpose: to prepare
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effective citizens and, therefore, to enhance and stabilize
the “common good.” Whether or not the automobile argument for market choice makes sense, Friedman’s theory has
successfully captured the attention of those looking for solutions to the abject failure of so many urban schools to educate far too many students.
A focus on school choice is a focus on urban schools.
School choice is not a significant issue in suburban or rural
schools. Friedman’s arguments achieved persuasive power
because many in the public schools who advocate against
choice have not addressed the pronounced and serious problems confronting urban schools (i.e., high dropout rates and
unacceptable racial achievement gaps in standardized test
scores). Market advocates are seemingly winning the ideological battle for control of educational policymaking. Although 48% of 89 state legislators in six states expressed
preferences for 10 reforms other than vouchers (such as
enhanced teacher preparation and better early childhood
education), they still tended to accept pro-market arguments
for school reform in urban areas (Laitsch, 2002). Public
schools, argue the critics, have not served urban families
well. Market orientations have become the political and,
for some, the practical solution.
Our contention is simple: Whatever reform policy is
embraced to address the urban educational crisis must adhere to certain moral principles. First, it must do no harm to
the educational opportunities available to students and, second, it must empower all within the educational system to
achieve more fully to their personal potential, or in Dewey’s
terms, “to live life to the fullest” (Cremin, 1961, p.123).
Such principles necessarily constitute the moral foundation
of schools paid for by the public to serve the common good.
In the next section, we present a discussion of the reality of the need for urban school reform and a discussion of
the increased dominance of market theories in the reform
effort. We then argue for the need for moral perspectives in
relationship to embracing school choice program reforms.
And, finally, specific recommendations for school choice
are proffered that emphasize moral foundations as the core
of any market theory for public schools.

Urban Schools and the Emergence
of Market Approaches
Public education is perceived by many conservative
critics as the domain of the public school monopoly; that
monopoly, the critics contend, is fraught with a variety of
common evils: inefficiency, waste, and a lack of teacher accountability.
The public schools have had opportunities to “heal themselves,” especially since the issuance of the A Nation at Risk
report in 1983. The Risk report argued for internal reforms
(tougher coursework and higher, more flexible teachers’ salaries); the conservative reformers are demanding external
form: choice. Some educators used the report as a vehicle
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to argue for more resources and lower class sizes. Conservative critics are using the current “crisis” to argue for choice.
Choice is not a new concept. Adam Smith argued against
monopolies as a mechanism for providing service; Milton
and Rose Friedman (1980) “modernized” Smith’s concept
suggesting that market forces could and should influence
both school efficiency and teacher effectiveness. Indeed,
the Friedmans argued for a voucher plan that “would give
parents at all income levels freedom to choose the schools
their children attend” (p.188).
Market advocates argue that by creating competition
and giving parents options, strong schools will thrive and
weak schools will be forced to change or close. Choice proponents argue that the way to solve the (urban) school crisis
is to use competition to weed out weak and ineffective
schools. The same students who have historically had a disproportionate share of unqualified teachers are now going
to be a part of a reform experiment to see if competition can
produce better schools with more effective teachers.
Market theorists were so successful that in 2002 the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) federal legislation was passed
that proffered “public school choice” as a policy mandate.
Specifically, schools that failed to achieve specified adequate
yearly progress (AYP) goals must (after two years) provide
parents with the option to transfer their children to higher
performing public or charter schools, with priority status
offered to the lowest achieving, low income students. NCLB
made real what previously had been a practical possibility
in just selected communities. It also opened the door to a
wide variety of choice options that would challenge the
“hold” of public schools on public education.
Choice advocates place the emphasis on the private good
and the right of each parent to exercise choice. According
to Halchin (1999), “As a market-based education system,
charter schools present education as a consumer good, parents as consumers and students as commodities. The fragmentation of the school system, the weakening of the
common school ethos, and explicit messages encouraging
parents to shop around, all challenge views of education as
a public good” (p.24). The immediate winners and losers of
this shift from public to private good are unclear. Friedman
argued that it would be the most privileged who benefited
first (with opportunity trickle down to the poor). The longterm consequences of choice for society are potentially significant. That is, questions arise as to whether policies on
school choice potentially place urban school communities
at greater risk by diminishing the capacity of urban schools
to serve the least advantaged students (both immediately and
in the long-term) and by undermining the morale of urban
teachers (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Sawhill and Smith, 2000).
That is, does choice mitigate a collective community demand to improve the schools for the “adversely selected” by
placing too much emphasis on what fulfills personal needs?
Choice critics assert that whether high quality “choice”
schools will be available (the supply side) for the urban poor
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cannot be assured through current reforms because the resources (that is, the requisite number of classroom seats)
may not be available to support the exercise of choice. Further, they question whether the parents with access to choice
programs possess the requisite social, emotional and intellectual resources to make good education choices
(Robenstine, 2001). Elmore and Fuller (1996) argue:
…since parents and students with the least social
capital seem also to be the ones who are least likely
to engage in active choice, there are few demandside incentives in choice programs for educators to
engage in the deliberate design of programs that
appeal to, and work well for, the most disadvantaged students. So it seems unlikely that choice,
by itself, will stimulate creativity and improvement
in the development of new, more effective educational programs. The problem seems to lie in the
fact that the designers of choice programs have focused most of their attention, in all but a few cases,
on demand-side issues, such as who gets to choose
and how choices will be coordinated, rather than
on crucial supply-side details, such as how schools
and classroom actually differ. (p.197)
Critics of choice assert that the market solution falls
short in producing advantages to those most disadvantaged
(that is, those without adequate parental advocates). Some
evidence to support this claim may be emerging in Great
Britain. After two new laws were enacted in the late 1990s
allowing parent choice, middle class Catholic parents exercised choice motivated only by their private interests in what
was good for their children (Grace, 2002). Economists such
as Hoxby (2001) argue that the market will engender viable
schooling alternatives and enhanced teacher quality. The
problem is whether more universal opportunity for all students will emerge. For example, there is little or no longterm evidence to suggest that market theory will help all
schools perform more effectively, as is evidenced by what
has occurred in both New Zealand (Fiske and Ladd, 2000)
and Chile (Keller, 2001). Just as some Eastern European
countries may lack sufficient capital to use capitalistic principles to ground their economies, so, too, some schools may
be sufficiently different and insufficiently resourced as service providers that market approaches may (within the context of current resource allocations) be an inappropriate
mechanism for enhancing quality on a broad communitywide scale.
That market theories have encompassed or are capable
of encompassing a strong moral dimension is our concern.
Real free markets rarely exist; market capitalism in which
all the profits and all the costs are taken into consideration
are rare. Market advocates fail to factor in their formulas all
the “costs” of the consequences of choice for those most in
need of public advocates. As long as schooling is valued for
all children, the costs of educating all children are costs the
public must bear. The financial costs of educating both those
who opt out of traditional public schools (by exercising
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choice) and those who are left behind in those schools (because they are unwilling or unable to exercise choice) must
be taken into account. Further, those left behind will likely
rachet up huge costs as it’s likely they will be left in most
dire and desperate circumstances and with evidence of the
greatest personal need.
Thus far, there is little evidence that competitive market theories include all relevant stakeholders and, therefore,
sufficiently benefit all educational consumers. Despite
Friedman’s trickle down dream, evidence indicates that
markets frequently do not benefit all consumers. Markets
have always enhanced the lives of some but, concomitantly,
appear to be incapable of enhancing the lives of all. So far,
economic schemes are silent on ways to adequately support
a high quality education for both those exercising choice
and those left behind. In any choice scheme, market theories must be built that ensure benefits for all, which is, admittedly, an enormous, perhaps impossible, challenge that
heretofore has not been realized, creating a certain moral
void.
An additional consequence of the market approach is
the wide spectrum of options created to serve children and
families. Not all choice options may further the common
good (i.e., prepare students to be full members in a free and
equal democracy) because some choice options may be either intentionally or unintentionally exclusionary (e.g., an
all-girls or all-boys school). Assuring each child an education for democratic citizenship is a longstanding and fundamental moral good. This moral good, this right of all
children to a quality education, is built into the heritage of
public schooling (Guttman, 2003). Those creating new
school paradigms extol the virtues of the learning communities they are creating and the innovative ways of socializing children (Fuller, 2000), but some options fail to assure
tolerance and equity, and to sustain the traditional values
that schools historically have held. For example, some faithbased schools might restrict freedoms for groups such as
gays and lesbians rather than guarantee unrestricted democratic liberty.
Additionally, if market choices expand too rapidly, traditional public schools may be weakened to the point that
the government cannot guarantee space and opportunity for
each child, especially if and when some choice schools fail.
Such a governmental “quality” guarantee is essential within
a compulsory educational system and that guarantee may be
particularly difficult to achieve in smaller cities where resource options are more limited.
Many who oppose choice as a false and empty solution
to failing urban schools call for massive investments in existing public schools. Their bottom line is that all children
must have access to high performing schools with excellent
teachers and that all students need options if choice schools
fail (Fiske and Ladd, 2000). Unfortunately, one of the emerging NCLB problems appears to be that too few high-quality
schools are available and proximate for students in urban
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areas. Brownstein (2003) writes: “given the choice between
the low performing school in their own neighborhood and
the mediocre school ten miles away, [urban] parents may
stick to the path of least resistance [and choose low performing schools]” (p.48).
Moral concerns are naturally raised by school choice
because parent choice, believed by some to bolster the power
of the most disenfranchised families, actually may situate
families and students in an even more vulnerable and risky
status. Their status as “choosers” means that the quality of
their children’s education in urban environments is not assured as it is in more privileged communities. “Choice” is
offered disproportionately to those most disadvantaged and
those least well served by traditional public schools. As a
result, charter schools, one manifestation of the reform efforts, are an option for students in urban but not suburban
schools (Finnigan, et al., 2004). Privileged parents can comfortably avoid the “advantages” of the market because historically, more likely than not, they have been served by
effective schools and certified teachers. The elite and the
middle class have had less risky circumstances and they have
had the resources to choose housing in areas that demand
and assure high quality schools.
The reality is that charter schools, while smaller in enrollment, employ fewer certified teachers than do traditional
public schools—a 79% to 92% disadvantage (Finnigan et
al., 2004) and were less likely than traditional public schools
to meet state standards (Finnigan, 2004). There is also heated
debate regarding whether charter schools serve, proportionally, students who represent the socioeconomic diversity of
a community. Critics of charters argue that where charters
“fare well” (e.g., Colorado) is the result of having a disproportionately lower number of poor children.
A universal program of school competition is based on
a premise of winners and losers and, ultimately, of losers
being forced out of business. Yet those schools and students most in need may be the “losers” if market approaches
are implemented on a widespread basis because an advocacy system for the education of all children will be diminished as the personal preferences of selected parents emerge
and the collective voice of the community is mitigated. Wells
(1996) conceptually plays with this idea:
What will happen to these [high poverty] children
in an educational free market predicated on the
existence of both winners and losers? Who will
advocate for them? Who will respond to their sense
of injustice or their need for the security and cultural familiarity of a neighborhood school? These
are important policy questions. In a truly deregulated system there is no guarantee and no safety net
for these students. (p.48)
Though the NCLB legislation is still in its infancy, there
are early signs that it is not achieving its goals. Although
the legislation was intended to widen opportunities and fuel
competitive pressures to force improvements in public
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schools, some evidence exists that the law is not fully achieving intended effects. Brownstein (2003) observes:
It’s not only in the largest cities where the [NCLB]
law has fizzled. In Cleveland, where 15,000 students in 21 schools were eligible, just 36 children
requested transfers in the fall semester—and, of
those, nine eventually returned to their original;
schools. In Boston, where students in 65 schools
were eligible, apparently no students have used the
new law’s provisions to change schools. Likewise,
no students have moved in Dayton, Ohio, though
10 of the district’s 25 schools were on the state’s
list of failing schools. In Louisville, Kentucky,
2,900 kids in the Jefferson County Public Schools
were eligible to transfer. Only 180 have moved.
(p.42-43)
It is because of the “resistance” described by Brownstein
that many neoconservatives are now arguing for the voucher
option. Vouchers are an outgrowth of the perceived failure
of public school choice (i.e., there are an insufficient number of quality public schools).
Undoubtedly, public and private school choice options
are going to become an educational reality. The salient question is whether choice will be able to fulfill the moral obligation to provide quality schooling to America’s K-12 student
population. Or will choice further engender social and economic segregation and, as a result, mitigate the likelihood
of comprehensive moral solutions?

School Choice: A Moral Obligation
In this section, we attempt to lay out six moral principles that should ground school governance. Clearly, the
debate regarding school choice has been heated and ideological. Two perspectives have gained visibility. Conservative critics who advocate choice view the education
establishment as a protectionist monopoly, one seemingly
willing to tolerate mediocrity in order to preserve the status
quo. Educators dedicated to public schools view choice as
a threat, one that is willing to sacrifice the educational success of some children in order to achieve ideological goals.
Our intention is not to suggest that either perspective is
the best or right or most appropriate for children because
we already know the current system has failed far too many
young people and the choice system has still not demonstrated that it will succeed. Our principles are designed to
attempt a way of thinking about markets based on the moral
foundation that is the obligation of public education in this
country, a profession of moral actors (Soder, 1990).
Principle 1: The policies and practices put into place
must be ones that create opportunities for all students to
succeed without engendering, intentionally or unintentionally, the circumstances for some students to fail. Reformers
must aspire to a zero tolerance program for structures that
exist as opportunities for unintentional failure. Some stu-
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dents do choose intentionally to fail. It is regrettable but
true. However, no system of education should be created
that encourages such a choice. The current traditional system has fostered such choices for far too many students. And
competition commonly operates within a framework of winners and losers. Plans must be designed in such a way that
they preclude the kinds of loopholes that leave some children vulnerable, leave some children behind. For instance,
not all educators in urban schools have effectively interacted
with parents and adult family members of children they serve.
Without adequate information and access, these parents and
adult family members can find themselves ill-prepared to
make appropriate choices for their children (Ferrero, 2003).
These are the children that many choice programs do, indeed, leave behind, a consequence unacceptable in a choice
program that integrates markets with a strong moral dimension. They are also the students who have been left behind
in traditional educational structures. New structures must
“mend” the broken information and communication bridges
between families, communities, and schools. Families cannot make good choices absent good information about their
children and about their schools (Ferrero, 2003).
Principle 2: The choice programs that emerge must
expand beyond secular and religiously based schools. All
schools in a choice program supported by public money must
practice nondiscrimination and commit to ethnic, gender,
religious, ability (both physical and cognitive) and racial
equity. “Choice markets” that include schools where equality, tolerance, and nondiscrimination are not fundamental
values are flawed and will create pernicious long-term consequences for American society. Some sectarian schools discriminate on the basis of religion, for example. This reality
is contrary to a central moral principle: schools that leave
no child behind must ensure equity and militate against segregative practices.
Principle 3: The market policies on choice (and/or any
governance structure instituted as a result of choice schemes)
must be structured in a way that ensures high quality system-wide educational opportunities with no schools receiving, for whatever reasons, disproportional numbers of
students of high poverty (see Van Lier, 2004a). The idea is
not new. Dewey’s writings consistently argue for such an
approach; schools (within any community) must represent
for each child an essential guarantee. In Goodlad’s terms,
the “schools represent the only means to comply with the
law [regarding compulsory education]” (p.73) and because
of that fact any policy must foster more universal access,
especially for students who do not have advocates, to place,
even unintentionally, overwhelming numbers of “adversely
affected” students in specific schools.
Principle 4: The “right” to an education in any choice
program is a right exercised by parents on behalf of their
children. Advocates of “parental choice” rely heavily on
the word “parent.” These advocates frequently decry the
fact that parents who opt to send their children to private
schools are (unfairly) charged double for their children’s
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education: first by their school taxes and, second, by the
private school tuition (see discussion in Macedo, 2003).
Education “adequate for a first-class (free and equal) citizenship” is a child’s right in this country (Gutmann, 2003)
but it is a right exercised by parents.
Parents have no constitutional guarantee to select a
school of choice for their child to be paid for by taxpayers.
Hence, because of the disestablishment clause of the U.S.
Constitution, parents who select private religious schools
for their children are not guaranteed public financial support (Gutmann, 2003).
From a moral perspective, some argue that parental
power with respect to their children’s potential should not
be unlimited in a market milieu. Swift (2004) differentiates
between “unfair inequality” in the life chances of students
vs. “simple inequality” in life chances. School governance
policies necessarily will tolerate simple inequality, unfairness when it is the result of legitimate parent “partiality,” he
claims and if the “unfairness does no harm to the worst-off”
(p. 326). Admitting that there is real inequality in status due
to the unequal family backgrounds among children (i.e., some
more privileged toward formal education success than others), he argues, from principle, that this is “simple inequality.” In a market sense, he identifies an “unfair inequality,”
as circumstances where “parents are allowed differentially
to invest in their children’s potential-development…unfair
if some children have their potential developed more than
others just because of their parents’ preferences and/or capacity to act on those preferences.” (p. 326). To assure justice, schools (and communities) must, then, act in loco
parentis to preclude the population of students they serve
from sliding into “unfair inequality” environments. This
moral argument is grounded in the nexus between the child’s
right to an education and the parents’ economic power is
relevant to the next principle as well.
Principle 5: Teachers and schools must ensure that all
students, regardless of their financial wealth or personal resources, receive equal access to quality schools. School funding, community tax base, and family wealth all need to be
taken into consideration as sources of student support. If students are forced to attend school to ensure the public good,
schools and teachers must treat all students of every social
class fairly and equitably in order to assure the students’ good.
It is somewhat ironic that the market forces that allure
reformers are, in some sense, the same forces that explain
the disintegration of the urban schools reformers who are
ostensibly trying to make better. A shrinking tax base within
large urban inner cities resulted from dramatic outsourcing
of jobs to the outer cities, the suburbs, and then off shore.
The move from a manufacturing to an information economy
upended the economic base of urban areas. In addition, corporate productivity is enhanced through improved efficiency,
including lower labor costs (i.e., job losses). For instance,
manufacturing jobs are almost nonexistent and other job
opportunities that historically supported the jobs of urban
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families and urban schools are gone. Corporate globalization has changed the labor force dynamics throughout the
country, most dramatically in urban areas. Schools supported
by those tax dollars are increasingly vulnerable, particularly
when schools compete with other state services for diminishing state funding as states attempt to make up for lower
federal funding for all programs. According to Anyon (1997):
Corporate profits flow to other countries because
such practices go unchallenged. We have been in a
long period of social quiescence. There has not, in
recent years, been sufficient will to challenge federal and state policies that maximize private wealth
while minimizing the public good. (p. 185)
This principle, then, obligates any choice scheme to be
one in which financial costs to urban schools will be no
greater than the financial benefits the choice program will
reap for those same schools.
Principle 6: The moral foundation of a market scheme
is related to the role of teachers and administrators: A choice
program must strengthen the professionalization of teaching as well as bolster its moral foundation. Teaching is a
moral act. Teachers in traditional schools are held to clear
standards of professional conduct. When teachers assume
roles in the marketplace, it is imperative that they behave
equally professional and ethical. Some argue that choice
might engender teacher deprofessionalization because of the
rapid turnover of teachers in choice environments. If true,
what costs redound to students in particular and education
in general because of choice reforms where the emphasis is
somewhat singularly on student achievement as opposed to
more generally on student success? Soder (1990) writes:
Compulsory schooling, then, carries with it immense
moral obligations and provides a legitimate basis for restructuring teacher professionalization rhetoric…it is precisely
because children are compelled [to attend school] and children are defenseless and have low status that teaching has
moral obligations and moral praiseworthiness. (p.74)
When schools compete for students, teachers are rewarded for increased enrollments (and those enrollments
result from student achievements). Teachers’ success is
measured by the extent to which they can account for what
might be a record of higher test scores (what the market
values) at the expense of equally substantive dimensions of
the common good, for instance, providing equitable access
to learning to poor and minority students, improving the
quality of life in inner city neighborhoods devastated by
poverty, and enhancing the job skills of future workers. These
measures, while beneficial to the common good, may be
devalued in a choice market because the emerging choice
environment may be “value-added” oriented through a narrow measure of student test scores.
The value-added concept ensures that some structures,
some systems, and some teachers function better than others. High performers in market driven schools are those
who achieve a defined goal: high test scores. And the cen-
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tral player in fostering that achievement is the teacher. Those
who embrace the market orientation are not concerned with
the credentials of the teacher; they are concerned with the
“outputs” produced by that teacher: student achievement
(Kanstoroom and Finn, 1999). Outputs such as test scores
are not readily or even reliably assessed, however. Data
need to be collected over several years before conclusions
can be reached about a school’s success and even informed
supporters of value-added approaches argue for cautions
around how test scores are used (Promise and Peril of Using
Value-Added Modeling, 2004). While market systems surely
will allow some schools to flourish with test score increases,
others will fail and without some type of centralized oversight the interests of the students will not be protected.

Policy Recommendations
Two ideas will be proffered regarding how educators
should respond to the current ideological tug-of-war regarding choice. First, controlled choice should become a policy
option. Controlled choice is not a new concept. Al Shanker
argued for a form of controlled choice years ago, especially
if teachers played a central role (Chubb, 2003). Shanker
envisioned charter schools as a form of controlled choice,
and they still represent an option. But, clearly some critical
questions have surfaced relative to the overall effectiveness
of charters and to whether charters are educating the same
“mix” of students evidenced in the larger communities within
which they are located. Controlled choice occurs when communities work together to identify schools (public or private) that meet students’ needs and transcend traditional
political and even geographic boundaries. Controlled choice
is important because markets are not perfect (Chubb, 2003).
Van Lier (2004) describes what it might look like for
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio):
At least some outer-ring suburban parents might
be willing to send their children to areas of Cleveland such as University Circle. There, a magnet
school could draw on resources at Case Western
Reserve University, University Hospitals and The
Cleveland Clinic, says Regano. (Cleveland School
of the Arts, a public magnet school adjacent to
University Circle, already enrolls suburban students.) (p.7)
Clearly this type of controlled choice creates complications but it also fosters real opportunities. First, it requires
schools and school districts to work together to identify better educational options and, second, it necessitates the development of more unique and innovative curricula which
are more likely to be appropriate to the unique learning needs
of urban students. Urban students are rejecting some of the
extant systemic reform educational structures. And, competition (and choice) has still not demonstrated that innovation will result from enhanced choice. That is bad news for
students of need in high poverty contexts. Controlled choice,
especially when it is based on more innovative cooperative
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structures, may actually engender the innovation that students need because adults will be working together to address a need rather than competing against one another to
achieve a political or goal.
The Dayton Early College Academy (Dayton, Ohio) is
an example of controlled choice. It represents a cooperative
partnership between very different entities (a public school
and private university) and it illustrates an entirely new curriculum model for how to reach urban students, which requires yet another form of cooperation between a local and a
state educational agency. The school is part of the public
system even though it operates outside some of the district’s
union agreements, which illustrate another form of cooperation. In the DECA case, cooperation brings together educational reformers with traditional educational leaders.
Second, school districts should begin to evolve more
loosely coupled administrative structures to ensure that all
schools in a school district (regardless of type) are under a
common umbrella of administrative oversight and operate
within certain educational parameters.
Cincinnati (Ohio) was one of the first communities to
experiment with the “umbrella” or “portfolio of schools”
concept. All schools (charter and traditional public) were a
part of the Cincinnati system, though some were more directly controlled by the school district than others. The key
was that the administrators for the district maintained some
involvement over all schools so that the students were not
adversely affected when and if a school were to fail.
The “portfolio of schools” approach places all schools,
regardless of type, under some type of community administrative structure. That structure focuses on ensuring the viability of each school using various forms of accountability
data. Each school may have its own independent board that
reports annually on student performance, especially as student tests scores are compared to those of students in demographically similar situations. Such community boards would
not function without managing at least some anticipated tension between the promises of choice (fewer bureaucratic
constraints on instructional innovation) and the realities of
accountability (bureaucratically established standards of
success) (Cohen-Vogel, 2003).
The umbrella administrative unit is essential because
market force approaches in education work under a spurious assumption that parents are going to make good choices
about their children’s educational opportunities. For some
children and some families the assumption is valid, but for
far too many urban children it is, quite simply, not true. Some
children in urban environments have absolutely no (or at
least very limited) adult oversight. Those children need
someone or some “body” to act as an advocate for their
needs. That body needs to ensure that adequate performance
data for all schools are available and that parents have adequate access to such data and that fair admissions processes
are in place for all schools to ensure that the segregation of
students by race or gender does not occur.
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The umbrella approach is also imperative because of
the limited (human and financial) resources available in most
communities. Without an umbrella structure, a variety of
potential providers (e.g., charters, for profits) compete for
extant resources to help with the support of their individual
schools. Such competition focuses the energy of adults in
opposition rather than having those energies working together
for the benefit of all students.
Umbrella structures are also important as a mechanism
to ensure that well-designed educational models within a
community evolve. Uncontrolled choice is potentially just
as problematic (and perhaps more so) than allowing current
dysfunctional structures to continue. A Brookings Institution publication explains the rationale for community oversight best:
Choice programs will not be implemented easily or
even cheaply. The surest way to help guarantee their
successes will be conscious, well-thought-out strategies drawing on the best thinking of the worlds of
government and philanthropy. And perhaps the surest way to encourage their failure is to implement
choice programs quickly, carelessly, and cheaply,
optimistic that at some point things will all work out
for the best (School Choice, 2004, p. 36).
A moral educational system is one where the focus is
on the students, with adults creating structures to ensure that
students in failing schools are not hopelessly on their own
when problems occur or not within structures where adults
are in a zero sum game for resources with some students
being adversely affected because “their” adult advocates
cannot compete successfully for educational advantages. The
community governing unit exists as a proxy parent that ensures all students have advocates if and when some schools
fail. A market theory of choice within which are embedded
strong moral constraints is one within which all urban children will be protected from policies or practices that limit
their full social and intellectual development.
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